In many countries there are post offices, under the physical control of a postal authority, where letters and packages can be mailed. An individual can walk into the post office and present their mailpiece to a postal clerk at the postal counter. The clerk will weigh the mailpiece to determine the appropriate postage required, collect the value from the individual (i.e. cash, credit card, etc.) to pay for the required postage, and print out and attach to the mailpiece evidence of postage paid.
FIG. 1 shows a traditional postal counter audit system 1 that is used to implement the procedure described above. The postal counter audit system 1 includes a personal computer (PC) 3, a scale 5, and a label printer 7 (which collectively form a postal counter system 8). The postal counter system 8 prints evidence of postage dispensed at the direction of the postal clerks. Each postal counter system 8 maintains a logfile in the PC 3 of all postage that it dispenses. The logfile data should match the value collected by the postal clerks for the postage dispensed.
As further shown in FIG. 1, several postal counter systems 8 are commonly networked together along with an administrative computer 9 at a postal facility 10. The administrative computer 9 is controlled by a postal administrator responsible for the proper operation of the postal facility 10, e.g., a local postmaster. The postal administrator collects the logfile from each postal counter system 8 (electronically via the administrative computer 9). These logfiles are compared with the cash receipts (cash, credit card transactions, etc.) collected at each postal counter system 8. Any discrepancies between the cash receipts and the logfiles are an indicator of potential fraud by a postal clerk. Additionally, all logfiles, or at least a summary of logfile data from the postal facility 10, and a summary of cash receipt data are transmitted (over existing communication networks 12) to a postal funds management computer 11. The postal funds management computer 11 also compares the received logfile data with the cash receipt data to determine if any discrepancies exist which would be evidence of potential fraud.
Unfortunately, existing postal counter audit systems 1 are subject to several types of fraud which may go undetected. Since the PC 3 includes a processor which is not a secure device, the logfiles stored in PC 3 may be easily tampered with by postal clerks that have access to PC 3 and some basic computer knowledge. As a result, a clerk could simply modify the logfiles (perhaps by deleting entries) and pocket the funds from the cash drawer associated with the modified records. Since the tampered logfiles would match the cash receipts, it would be difficult for a postal administrator to determine that a clerk was stealing postal funds. Moreover, an administrator (working on his own or in conjunction with a clerk) could also falsify records (logfile summaries and cash receipts) prior to transmission to the postal funds management computer 11 and such fraudulent activity might go undetected.
The above potential fraudulent activities are largely attributable to the fact that there is no prepayment of postage at a postal counter system 8 as there is with a conventional prepayment postage meter. That is, in a postage meter since the value contained therein has already been paid for, the problems associated with a cash basis transaction for postage does not exist. Accordingly, the instant invention is directed toward the detection of fraud in a “pay for postage as you dispense” counter operation and the collection of collaborating evidence in support of such fraud detection.
Additionally, the postal counter audit system 1 does not have a source of data, separate from the data transmitted from the administrative computer 9 (or the postal counter system 8) to the funds management computer 11, that can be used to independently verify the data transmitted from the administrative computer 9. For example, if the logfiles are altered as discussed above, there is no data feedback based on the processing of the actual mailpieces passing through the mailstream that is used to detect such fraud.
Yet another problem occurs when several people operate a single postal counter system 8. In this situation, even if fraud is detected, it may be difficult to identify only those individuals committing the fraud.
Finally, another potential problem may exist if a postal clerk delays the reporting of logfiles. That is, if a postal clerk lags behind in sending out up to date logfiles, some of the cash received could be pocketed. In this situation the cash sent to the administrator would still match the transmitted logfiles which lag behind.